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Abstract
We analyze an overlapping generations model which explicitly in 
cludes a secondary asset market. The economy is aﬀected by a one 
time shock which causes some of these assets to become toxic. As
a response the government may intervene by buying these assets at
market value and removing them from trade. When the shock is not
anticipated we ﬁnd that government intervention cannot improve upon
the laissez faire equilibrium. However, when agents anticipate that a
crisis may occur, removing the toxic assets dominates laissez faire,
particularly when the toxic asset holders are ﬁnancing the interven 
tion scheme. Finally, we show that curbing incentives which drive
investors to ﬁnd high yield opportunities decreases the severity of a
crisis once it occurs, but also output.
.
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1 Introduction
The recent crisis was a crisis of the ﬁnancial sector. At some point assets
that were regarded as ”safe” turned out to be risky. More importantly, the
complicated ﬁnancial structures that have developed over the last decade
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1or so made it next to impossible to separate the ”good” assets from the
”toxic” ones. As a result, ﬁnancial markets collapsed and the crisis has
quickly become ”real”.1 In response to these developments a plethora of
government programs have been developed.2 Some of these programs aimed
at removing ”troubled assets” from the market. The idea was to ”clean
up” the balance sheets of ﬁnancial institutions and restore conﬁdence in
the ﬁnancial markets.3 The programs have all been ﬁnanced through debt,
clearly implying shifting the burden to future generations.
The policy of buying toxic assets has encountered strong criticism claim 
ing that the money is being wasted.4 Moreover, there is a prevailing sense
that intervention induces moral hazard. In other words, while intervention
might have been justiﬁed due to the surprise nature of the current crisis, dy 
namic considerations suggest that it should not be used in the future to avoid
moral hazard. This sentiment is quite explicit in President Obama’s speech
at Wall Street on the ﬁrst anniversary of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy,
where he said: ”Those on Wall Street cannot resume taking risks without re 
gard for consequences, and expect that next time, American taxpayers will be
there to break their fall.”5 In addition, many countries have moved to limit
boni in the ﬁnancial sector as an attempt to further reduce opportunistic
behavior.
The purpose of our paper is to address the above questions. We construct
a model in which secondary asset prices collapse due to a crisis. While the
occurrence of the crisis is taken to be exogenous, it is assumed to generate
toxic assets. We consider government programs removing these assets from
trade thereby restoring conﬁdence in the market. We distinguish between two
scenarios and two ﬁnancing schemes. In the ﬁrst scenario the crisis comes as
a complete surprise while in the second it is stochastically anticipated. The
1There is an immense body of literature discussing the events leading to the crisis. For
a succinct overview see Blanchard (2009).
2The St. Louis Fed provides a chronological list of events and govern 
mental programs that have been implemented in the U.S. since 2007. See
http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=home. For an international survey of the
events see, e.g. Goddard et al (2009).
3The goals of the program may be found in
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1150.htm For details of the program, see
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/tarpinfo.htm
4The U.S. Congress has appointed an oversight panel to monitor the Troubled As 
set Releif Program (TARP). The February 2009 report of that panel pointed out that
”Treasury paid substantially more for the assets it purchased under the TARP than their
then current market value.” See http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop 020609 report.pdf
5http://www.huﬃngtonpost.com/2009/09/14/obama wall streetspeech
n 285841.html
2program is either ﬁnanced by current asset holders or by future generations.
We ﬁnd that in terms of the economy’s output, the usefulness of the program
depends on the combination of these features. When the crisis comes as a
complete surprise removing toxic assets is at best useless and may even be
harmful if ﬁnanced by future generations. On the other hand, should the
crisis be stochastically anticipated, intervention ﬁnanced by current asset
holders is beneﬁcial while it is detrimental if ﬁnanced by future generations.
Finally, considering policies aimed at reducing opportunistic behavior, we
ﬁnd that they are associated with a tradeoﬀ between the severity of the
crisis and the average level of output.
Formally, we use an overlapping generations model to focus on trade in
ﬁnancial assets. Abstracting from the complexities of ﬁnancial intermedi 
ation in our framework, ﬁnancial assets are traded directly in competitive
markets. Within this setup, we consider an exogenous shock that wipes out
the underlying value of some of these assets, creating a ”lemons problem”.
To understand the modeling idea, consider an overlapping generations
environment which combines the basic structure proposed by Diamond (1965)
with renewable capital and a Lucas ”tree economy” (Lucas 1978). Moreover,
capital outlives agents thereby giving rise to secondary asset markets (see
Bencivenga, Smith and Starr 1996). Speciﬁcally, agents are two period lived.
When young they are endowed with one unit of labor, but want to consume
in both periods of their lives. Output consists of ”apples” which grow on
”trees”. Apples may be either consumed or planted. Apples planted in the
current period turn into fruit bearing trees in the following two periods and
die afterwards. Thus, investment in trees remains productive for a longer
duration than the life of the generation that has initially planted them.
The ”apple industry” consists of proﬁt maximizing ”ﬁrms” which operate
in a competitive environment. These ﬁrms operate one of two tree growing
technologies; a low and a high yield technology where the latter is riskier.
At each period newly created ﬁrms issue shares to raise ”capital” which is
used to purchase apples (from the current young) and plant them. Shares
represent claims on the future proﬁts generated by the respective ﬁrms. In
the following period these ﬁrms require labor supplied by the young to work
in the ”orchard”. The ﬁrms pay competitive wages and allocate dividends to
their current owners. These owners (the current old) sell their shares (i.e.,
claims on the proﬁts to be generated by ﬁrms in the consecutive period) to
the current young. The current old consume the proceeds of these sales, and
the dividends they receive according to their share ownership. The current
young allocate their wage income to consumption and saving both in shares
of existing ﬁrms through the secondary asset market and in newly issued
shares sold on the primary market. However, the latter market consists of
3ﬁrms with diﬀerent yields and the young also invest resources in order to
search for the best investment opportunities.
To capture the idea of a ”crisis” we assume that the economy is initially
in steady state. We introduce a commonly known one time shock which may
come as a surprise (case I) or be stochastically anticipated (case II). When
occurring the shock reduces the productivity of all ﬁrms (for instance, due
to a disease that aﬀects trees) and has an additional impact in the ensuing
period. Speciﬁcally, some orchards (ﬁrms) become sterile and do not bear
fruit in the following period (in keeping with the story, farmers of some
orchards cannot curb the disease of last period’s seedlings). Hence, these
orchards have become worthless. In contrast, trees in other orchards are
fully cured. While the market knows the fraction of aﬀected orchards, it
cannot identify them, thereby creating a ”lemons” problem in the secondary
asset market. In particular, claims on sterile orchards are ”toxic” because
they depress the value of the entire secondary market. Furthermore, in order
to discuss incentive issues associated with policy, we assume that the mix of
technologies emerging from search is related to the severity of the crisis.
The occurrence of a crisis generates an adjustment path of investment,
output, consumption, wages and asset prices. We consider two diﬀerent tax 
ﬁnanced intervention schemes whereby the government oﬀers to purchase
toxic assets at market prices in order to remove them from trade. The ﬁrst
scheme taxes the current old (i.e., asset holders) while the second is ﬁnanced
by the young. We ask whether such schemes can improve the economy’s
performance along that adjustment path distinguishing between the surprise
and anticipated crisis scenarios. In addition we investigate the tradeoﬀs
associated with attempts to aﬀect the incentives to search by conditioning
taxes on the outcome of the latter.
Our paper is part of the growing literature discussing the recent crisis.
As is well known, what started in the relatively small sub prime sector in
the U.S. has quickly aﬀected the global economy (see e.g. Blanchard 2009,
Demyanyk and van Hemert 2008, and Reinhart and Rogoﬀ 2008). Since
”toxic assets” could not be easily recognized, counter party risk could not be
assessed and the credit market (particularly the inter bank loan market) col 
lapsed (see Gorton and Metrick 2009). To alleviate this problem and restore
conﬁdence, governments introduced programs aiming at cleansing the bal 
ance sheets of ﬁnancial institutions (e.g., the Troubled Asset Relief Program,
in the U.S.). There exists evidence that these programs were quite eﬀective
(see e.g. Veronesi and Zingales 2010 as well as Bayazitova and Shivdasani
2009). Our analysis is most closely related to the literature which examines
the impact of intervention in environments with informational asymmetries
(see, e.g., Dang, Gorton and Holmstr¨ om 2009, Tirole 2010, Uhlig 2009 and
4the literature therein). While the focus of that literature is on liquidity
provision, we are mainly interested in the risk related allocative role of the
ﬁnancial market and the dynamics of the economy within a simple informa 
tional structure.6
The paper proceeds as follows. Next section introduces the model dis 
cussing technology and agents. Section 3 characterizes the dynamic equilib 
rium. Section 4 speciﬁes an example used in the remainder of the paper.
Section 5 describes policies under surprise crisis and a numerical analysis of
this case is conducted in section 6. Section 7 considers an anticipated crisis
and provides a numerical analysis. The last section oﬀers some concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a discrete time, overlapping generations model. The economy
is populated by a measure 1 continuum of identical two period lived agents
which appear every period. In addition, there is a continuum of ﬁrms pro 
ducing apples referred to below as ”orchards”. All markets to be described
below are perfectly competitive and prices are measured in apples of the
current period. To set the stage, we describe ﬁrst the economy ignoring the
possibility of a crisis.
2.1 Technology
There are two technologies generating identical trees. Technology 1 turns an
”apple” planted at period t−1 into a ”new tree” at period t which becomes an
”old tree” in t+1. Technology γ only requires a fraction γ < 1 of an apple to
generate such a tree. Orchards are generated by one of the two tree growing
technologies. Given an orchard, the production function of apples is orchard 
age dependent. For new orchards, it is a standard constant returns to scale
function given by Fs(q(t − 1),ℓ(t)), where ℓ(t) stands for labor employed by
the orchard, and q(t − 1) denotes the number of trees growing in it. Apples
grown by old orchards do not require labor. Output is proportional to the
number of trees in the orchard, but is also aﬀected by the economy wide
number of trees. Speciﬁcally, an old orchard generates Fσ(Q(t − 2))q(t − 2)
apples when employing q(t − 2) old trees and where Q(t − 2) denotes the
6In fact, based on a micro study, Kahle and Stultz (2010) argue that the main eﬀect
of the crisis was that of increased risk rather than credit contraction.
5aggregate number of old trees in the economy, with F ′
σ < 0.7 Old trees fully
depreciate in the process of production.
A new orchard that has planted q(t − 1) trees last period generates at
period t proﬁts of
Ds(t) = Fs(q(t − 1),ℓ(t)) − w(t)ℓ(t) (1)










q(t − 1) (3)
Since old orchards do not require labor, total dividends of orchards using
trees planted two periods ago are:
Dσ(t) = Fσ(Q(t − 2))q(t − 2) (4)
To ﬁnance the planting of new trees orchards issue shares. Without loss
of generality, we normalize a share to represent a claim on the future proﬁts






dσ(t) = Fσ(Q(t − 2)) (6)
To further simplify our presentation and due to the CRS assumption, we
impose that the ”number” of orchards equals the size of a generation, i.e.
measure 1.
7Notice that due the CRS assumption, output of the new tree orchards can be written
as Fs(1,ℓ(t)/q(t))q(t). At the aggregate, there is one unit of labor, and q(t) = Q(t˙ ) (hence,
the equivalent of F′
σ < 0 holds also with respect to the new orchard production function
since Fsℓ > 0). The speciﬁcation of the old orchard production function follows the same
logic. However, to develop an analytically tractable example we avoid labor allocation
issues between the two types of orchards, and assume that the individual producers take
the coeﬃcient Fσ( ) as given. See footnote 9 for further discussion.
62.2 Agents
Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor in the ﬁrst period of his life. The
preferences of an agent born at period t are given by U(c1(t),c2(t),e(t)) =
u(c1(t))+βu(c2(t))−e(t), where ci(t) denotes the apple consumption by the
agent in the ith period of his life, i = 1,2 and e(t) is search eﬀort.
The young supply labor services perfectly inelastically. The labor income
is used for current consumption and for saving. The latter is allocated to pur 
chasing ownership shares in either new or old orchards. From the foregoing,
new orchards may be using either tree growing technology 1, or γ. Young
agents need to invest eﬀort, e, in order to search for high yield orchards (those
using the γ technology). Given eﬀort, λ(e) denotes the likelihood of ﬁnding
such an orchard, with λ
′( ) ≥ 0, λ
′′( ) ≤ 0. We assume that the outcome
of search is private information and is revealed before consumption decisions
are made.
Saving of an agent born in t is allocated between shares of new and old
orchards, s(t) and σ(t) respectively. The price of a newly issued share by
an orchard using the low yield technology is 1. This follows from the above
assumption that each apple generates a single tree, and the normalization
that a share is a claim on future proﬁts of a single tree. Obviously successful
searchers invest only in high yield orchards. Hence successful agents pay γ
per share. The price diﬀerence between shares of the two orchard types is
maintained by the informational asymmetry.
Let ξ
j denote the share price faced by agents. Accordingly, ξ
us = 1 if
the agent’s search was unsuccessful and ξ
s = γ < 1 if search was successful.
Saving can be written as ξ
js(t)+p(t)σj(t) where p(t) is the old orchard share
price and j = us,s.8 In the following period agents receive the respective
dividends and proceeds from selling assets in the secondary market. Contin 










2(t) = [ds(t + 1) + p(t + 1)]s
j(t) + dσ(t + 1)σ
j(t). (8)
At the portfolio selection stage there are three assets; two in the primary
market (orchards using technology 1 and those using technology γ) and one
in the secondary market. Observe that by construction the rate of return on
8The expression for saving rules out an intra generational loan market where the suc 
cessful searchers borrow from the unsuccessful ones in order to increase their investment in
the high yield project. In other words, we assume that such a market involves suﬃciently
high transactions costs. Observe that in the absence of such costs no equilibrium would
exist in our framework, see e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
7γ technology trees is higher than that of low yield new trees. Since there are
just two types of investors (successful and unsuccessful searchers) all three
types of assets can only be held in equilibrium if returns are equalized be 
tween two of them. In the remaining we focus on the natural case where
successful agents solely invest in high yield new trees, while the unsuccess 
ful hold a portfolio of both low yield new trees and old trees. Anticipating
the equilibrium where λ also measures the fraction of successful searchers,
the foregoing restriction implicitly requires that the success rate is not too
big. Otherwise, the supply of secondary assets emanating from successful
searchers could be suﬃciently large to absorb the entire savings of the un 
successful searchers. In that case, the economy would be in a corner solution
with only two assets. From the point of view of our analysis, this case is of
no interest since in equilibrium there would be no informational asymmetry.




1 (t)) + β [ds(t + 1) + p(t + 1)]uc(c
us
2 (t)) = 0 (9)
−p(t)uc(c
us
1 (t)) + βdσ(t + 1)uc(c
us
2 (t)) = 0, (10)
and for the successful:
−γuc(c
s
1(t)) + β [ds(t + 1) + p(t + 1)]uc(c
s
2(t)) = 0. (11)
Clearly, (9) and (10) imply the no arbitrage condition which equalizes the
rates of return of low yield new trees and old trees:
dσ(t + 1)
p(t)
= ds(t + 1) + p(t + 1). (12)
Finally, the rate of return on high yield new trees is [ds(t + 1) + p(t + 1)]/γ.
Prior to searching agents anticipate their post search consumption stream.






2(t)), j = s,us. (13)
Therefore ex ante agents equate their respective marginal beneﬁt of search
to the marginal cost thereof. Letting e(λ) = λ






3 Equilibrium and Saddle Path
All young agents are ex ante identical and arrive at the same search eﬀort
choice, generating the same success likelihood. Due to the law of large num 
bers, λ(t) is, therefore, the fraction of successful young agents. Moreover the
8constant returns to scale assumption implies that the number of orchards
and their size does not matter.





sj(t),σj(t),Sj(t),q(t),Q(t),ds(t),dσ(t),w(t),p(t)}t≥1 where Sj(t) denotes ag 
gregate primary investment for j = s,us, and such that, given initial period 1
amounts of aggregate old and new trees, Q(−1) and Q(0), the following hold:
1. All markets clear. Speciﬁcally:

    
    
λ(t)ss(t) + (1 − λ(t))sus(t) = q(t) = Q(t)
sj(t) = Sj(t), j = s,us
(1 − λ(t))σus(t) = q(t − 1)
σs(t) = 0
ℓs(t) = ℓus(t) = 1
(15)
2. All agents and ﬁrms optimize, taking market prices as given. Speciﬁ 
cally, equations (2), (3), (4), (9), (10), (11) and (14) hold.
3. Perfect foresight prevails.
The ﬁrst equation in (15) captures the market clearing requirement of
new trees. The LHS aggregates per capita (in each generation) investment
of successful and unsuccessful agents. The RHS is the per capita number
of trees in the apple production process, q, which is also the corresponding
aggregate number of trees, Q. The second equation identiﬁes individual with
per capita primary investments. The third and fourth equations result from
the observation that only the unsuccessful participate in the secondary asset
market. Finally the last equation follows from the assumption that leisure
has no value.
Applying the equilibrium conditions, we rewrite the wage equation (2),
as follows:
w(t) = ω(Q(t − 1)). (16)
It implies that the income of the young depends solely on aggregate amount
of new trees. In addition, we denote the equilibrium marginal product of
new trees (which is also the dividend per tree) by:
∂Fs(Q(t − 1),1))
∂q
=  (Q(t − 1)). (17)
Using the equilibrium conditions and applying (16) and (17) to (9), (11)
and (12) yields a dynamic system which can be reduced to a pair of ﬁrst
order diﬀerence equations in Q(t − 1), Q(t), p(t) and p(t + 1).
9As is usually the case in such environments, this system has only one
initial condition, Q(t − 1). Absent further restrictions, it is indeterminate.
In order to uniquely determine the equilibrium path we assume that the
dynamic system satisﬁes the saddle path property, which imples that the state
variable Q(t − 1) determines not only Q(t), but also p(t). Put diﬀerently,
under this condition, there exists a pricing function
p(t) = P(Q(t − 1)) (18)
so that the single initial condition becomes suﬃcient to generate a unique
equilibrium path.9
In general, however, the pricing function (if it exists) cannot be charac 
terized analytically. A standard approach requires linearizing the above sys 
tem and approximating the pricing function locally around the steady state.
However, this approach is not capable of answering some of the questions we
ask below.10 Instead, in the remaining we turn to an analytical example and
explicitly solve for the pricing function.
4 A Speciﬁed Example
In the remaining of the paper we use a speciﬁed economy for which the
pricing function is analytically computable from the underlying preferences
and production functions. In particular, we use the following functional
forms:
• Preferences: u(c) = ln(c),
• Eﬀort cost: e(λ) = κ0 + κ1λ + 1
2κ2λ
2,
• New tree technology: Fs(q,ℓ) = Aqαℓ1−α, 0 < α < 1,
• Old tree technology: Fσ(Q) = ΨQα2−1.
9The restrictions on the technology generating apples from old trees reduce the dimen 
sionality of the state space and enable us to provide an analytically tractable example.
A more general speciﬁcation would have included labor in that technology as well, e.g.
Fσ(q(t−2),ℓσ(t)). This would require labor to be allocated between the two technologies,
and the equilibrium wage would depend on both Q(t−2) and Q(t−1). Consequently the
pricing function would also depend on these state variables. Unfortunately, we could not
ﬁnd a speciﬁcation of this form generating an analytical solution for the pricing function.
10In particular, when the crisis is anticipated, the economy’s path prior to the crisis
diﬀers from the post crisis one. By construction, a linearization around the steady state
cannot capture this diﬀerence.
10For this speciﬁcation the dynamic system is characterized by the following
set of equations:

         










p(t) =  (Q(t)) + p(t + 1)
λ(t)Ss(t) + (1 − λ(t))Sus(t) = Q(t)
(19)
together with the appropriate condition for the choice of eﬀort.
Lemma 1 For the above speciﬁcation, search eﬀort is a constant solving
e
′(λ) = −β ln(γ) (20)

















Since the logarithmic preferences imply that saving is a constant fraction
of income, cs
1 = cus
1 . Moreover, the rate of return for successful searchers is






γ verifying the claim.
Notice that in (19) the ﬁrst two equations follow from (9) and (11), the
third is the no arbitrage condition (12) and the last one results from the
equilibrium requirement. Moreover, search eﬀort is time independent. Ob 
serve that multiplying the ﬁrst equation by (1 − λ), the second by λ and
adding them (using the equilibrium condition), the entire dynamics of the




Q(t) + p(t)Q(t − 1) = Λω(Q(t − 1))
Fσ(Q(t−1))







γ + (1 − λ)
 
. The saddle path property implies p(t) =
P(Q(t−1)) and p(t+1) = P(Q(t)). Accordingly the system (22) consists of
two ﬁrst order diﬀerence equations both in Q(t). Hence both equations must
be identical. This imposes restrictions on the pricing function which allow
us to solve for P( ).




The resulting dynamic system satisﬁes:
Q(t) =  Q(t − 1)
α (24)
where ν and   depend on the underlying parameters.
Proof. See Appendix.
Notice that the dynamic relationship obtained here is of the same shape as
that obtained in the basic Solow (1956) model with a Cobb Douglas produc 
tion function, or the Diamond (1965) model with Cobb Douglas production
and logarithmic preferences.
5 Surprise Crisis and Policies
We start by considering a surprise crisis and assuming that the system is
initially in its steady state (where ”∗” denotes variable in steady state). At
some point τ a one period shock occurs that reduces the productivity of all
orchards by 0 < ζ < 1. In addition, at τ + 1 the orchards which originated
from the high yield growing technology of period τ − 1 become sterile. In
contrast, the remaining orchards are unaﬀected in τ + 1, still generating
Fσ(Q∗) apples per tree.11 12
The occurrence of the shock and its implications are common knowledge
at the beginning of period τ (i.e. before any period τ decisions are under 
taken). Moreover, at period τ shareholders know whether their orchard will
be sterile at τ + 1 since they know whether the high yield technology has
been used to grow them. In contrast, buyers of secondary market assets can 
not identify the shares associated with sterile orchards (keep in mind that
the tree growing technology is private information). Due to the absence of
11Alternatively, we could specify that old trees generate Fσ((1 − ζ)Q(t − 1)) apples
without signiﬁcantly aﬀecting the conclusions. The chosen structure allows us to concen 
trate on the ”net eﬀect” of the shock on the secondary asset market ignoring additional
implications due to secondary productivity eﬀects.
12The extreme asymmetric treatment of the two types of orchards is intended to cap 
ture a salient characterisitc of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. The high yield instruments
developed by the ﬁnancial industry all collapsed at the same time due to their instrinsic
interrelationship. Commenting on this feature of the ﬁnancial sector, Cochrane (2009)
has expressed the idea succintly as follows : ”....: it turns a “smooth” risk, like equities,
which are repriced routinely, into “earthquake” risk that either pays a steady stream or
fails catastrophically and unpredictably.....”.
12other transactions costs, we assume they buy a ”market portfolio” carrying
the average payoﬀ.
In the sequel we examine the dynamic repercussions of the shock on the
equilibrium path, considering two policy scenarios. In the ﬁrst, we let the
market absorb the shock while in the second, we analyze public intervention
schemes.
The No Intervention Case: Due to the shock, period τ wages are reduced
to ω((1 − ζ)Q∗). Moreover, the average output per old tree at period τ + 1
becomes (1 − ˆ λ)Fσ(Q∗) where ˆ λ is the fraction of high yield trees given by
λSs∗/Q∗. These changes aﬀect the secondary market price, p(τ), and invest 
ments in the primary market, Q(τ).13 Once the latter has been determined
the entire future path of the economy can be generated from the saddle path
property using (22). However, the value of Q(τ) (and of p(τ)) cannot be de 
termined without knowledge of p(τ +1). This feedback requirement is closed
by the pricing function and the perfect foresight condition. It yields a system
analogous to (19) for the crisis period τ. Altogether, the system determining




Q(τ) + p(τ)Q∗ = Λω((1 − ζ)Q∗)
(1−ˆ λ)Fσ(Q∗)
p(τ) =  (Q(τ)) + P(Q(τ)).
(25)
The Intervention Case: We now assume that a public authority intervenes
by oﬀering to purchase shares of sterile orchards (hereafter toxic assets) re 
moving them from future trade. The public tender is made at market prices.
We assume that shareholders of toxic assets accept the public tender since
they have no disadvantage from doing so; from the foregoing, they have the
relevant information and they sell at market price.
The intervention scheme is ﬁnanced by lump sum taxes. The cost of the
program is T(τ) = ˆ λp(τ)Q∗. Letting φ denote the fraction of this cost paid
by the young, their tax amounts to T1(τ) = φT(τ). The equilibrium period τ






(1 − ˆ λ)Q∗
 
= Λ[ω((1 − ζ)Q∗) − T1(τ)]
Fσ(Q∗)
p(τ) =  (Q(τ)) + P(Q(τ)).
(26)
As of period τ + 1 the equilibrium follows from the saddle path property.
13Observe that search eﬀort remains unaﬀected for the same reasons as in Lemma 1.
13The equation systems (25) and (26) emphasize the three relevant as 
pects of intervention. First, by removing toxic assets, intervention reduces
the stock of old trees traded in the secondary market (LHS, ﬁrst equa 
tion). Second, intervention involves taxation reducing disposable income of
the young (RHS, ﬁrst equation). Finally, by removing toxic assets, inter 
vention increases the rate of return in the secondary market (LHS, second
equation).
Lemma 3 An intervention (INT) fully taxing the old leads to the same
adjustment path as that of the no-intervention (NO) case except for a one-
time secondary market price diﬀerence at period τ, given by pINT(τ)(1−ˆ λ) =
pNO(τ).
The result of this lemma is straightforward since under either policy the
old fully carry the loss and the young obtain the average output in the fol 
lowing period. However, Lemma 3 does not contain any information on the
relative merit of diﬀerent tax schemes.
6 Numerical Analysis of a Surprise Crisis
This section uses a numerical example to provide an intuition on the econ 
omy’s adjustment path under two extreme tax schemes either levying the tax
solely on the old or on the young. For the purpose of this experiment, we
choose the following parameter values:
Table 1: Parameter Values
Variable Symbol Value
Second period weight in preferences β 0.75
Cost advantage of ”high yield” capital γ 0.8
Productivity of ”new” capital A 7.8
Output elasticity of ”new” capital α 0.3
Productivity of ”used” capital Ψ 2.7
Crisis probability π 0.2
Tax share of the young φ 0 or 1
At steady state, these parameter values yield an investment rate of 0.14
(out of total output), and a rate of return for the unsuccessful searchers
of 2.34. The latter should be interpreted with caution, since the association
between a ”period” in this model and ”real” time is not straightforward. The
14value of Ψ was obtained by setting the steady state value of ν (the coeﬃcient
of the pricing function) to 1.14
While we make no claim of having ”calibrated” the model, we want to
emphasize that the chosen parameters are ”reasonable” if we choose to treat
a ”period” as representing ten years. To get some feeling, an accumulated
return of 2.34 is obtained by annualizing an interest rate of 8.8% over ten
years. Similarly, it takes about ten years to compound a yearly discount
factor of 0.97 (commonly used in RBC models) into 0.75. A crisis probability
of 0.2 per period is equivalent to a yearly crisis probability of 0.025 over ten
years.
The results depicted below focus on aggregate investment in new trees,
secondary asset prices, aggregate saving of the young and total output. The
no intervention case is represented in Figure 1 as percentage deviations from
the corresponding steady state values. As expected, total output decreases
when the shock hits, due to the negative impact on productivity. In the
following period the shock persists because some of the old trees are sterile.
The latter eﬀect is mitigated due to the increased investment in the previous
period. At the crisis the productivity shock reduces wages and hence saving.
Next period wages and saving increase, due to the increased investment.
14The relationship between Ψ and ν is given in the Appendix.
15Figure 1: Surprise crisis with no intervention
The sharp decrease of secondary asset prices during the crisis reﬂects the
eﬀect of the ”toxic orchards”. Finally, primary investment is inﬂuenced by a
saving and a rate of return eﬀect. The saving eﬀect has already been shown
to be negative. With respect to the second eﬀect, the crisis implies a decline
in the return of secondary assets making primary assets more attractive. This
eﬀect shifts the portfolio composition of the unsuccessful searchers in favor
of the latter. In addition, search incentives increase since the rate of return
for successful searchers remains unaﬀected. In our numerical example the
latter eﬀects dominate thus raising investment.
Notice that the behavior of investment is driven also by the fact that in
our speciﬁcation the information about the onslaught of a crisis and the end
of the crisis arrive at the same moment in time. Separating the two events
would generate a lasting investment depression, until that time when the
crisis is known to have come to an end.
16Figure 2: Intervention vs. No Intervention: Surprise Crisis
The intervention regimes are shown in Figure 2 in terms of relative devia 
tions from the corresponding no intervention values at the same period. The
solid line represents taxing the old (φ = 0) and the dashed one corresponds
to taxing the young (φ = 1). In accordance with Lemma 3, in the former case
all real variable follow an identical path as under no intervention while the
secondary asset price adjusts upwards, reﬂecting the removal of the ”toxic
orchards”.
In contrast, taxing the young adversely aﬀects the real variables. Intu 
itively, the young’s disposable income decreases, thereby decreasing saving.
Moreover the return on the secondary asset is increased since the sterile old
orchards have been removed. Both eﬀects decrease the demand for primary
assets thereby reducing investment in new orchards. This in turn causes next
period’s output to decrease compared to the no intervention case. Conse 
quently, adjustment back to the steady state is slower. The impact of taxing
the young on the price in the secondary market at period τ + 1 is positive,
albeit smaller than that obtained when taxing the old. This follows directly
17from reducing the young’s disposable income. However, in the ensuing peri 
ods prices are higher because the marginal return to capital remains higher
throughout the adjustment path relative to the no intervention case.
7 Anticipated Crisis, Policies and Numerical
Analysis
In this section we assume that the crisis is probabilistically anticipated.
Speciﬁcally, young agents expect a crisis to occur next period with prob 
ability π. Furthermore, they already know which corresponding policy will
be enacted. To simplify the analysis, we maintain the assumption that the
crisis is a one time shock. This assumption allows us to invoke the saddle 
path property for the post crisis dynamics and obtain the exact same pricing
function as in the foregoing analysis, see equation (23).15 In particular, the
economy’s behavior as of period τ and onwards is solely determined by the
initial condition, Q(τ − 1) and the policy regime.
We also maintain the assumption that prior to the crisis, the economy is
on a stationary path. However, in contrast to the surprise case, the antici 
pation of the crisis and the corresponding policy aﬀect the initial stationary
state of the economy including Q(τ −1) = Q∗∗ (where ”∗∗” characterize vari 
able in the pre crisis stationary path). Due to the anticipation of the crisis,
the decision problem of agents prior to the crisis takes into account the pos 
sibility of the crisis and its ramiﬁcations. Hence, the model implies that the
pre crisis stationary state and the post crisis dynamic path are co determined
and depend on the policies.
Applying backward induction to the optimization problem of the young,
consider the consumption and saving decisions after the realization of the
search outcome. Generically agents maximize expected utility given by v∗∗ =
lnc∗∗
1 + β[(1 − π)lnc∗∗















2(τ) = (ds(τ) + p(τ))sj∗∗ + d∗∗




where j = s,us, σj∗∗ ≥ 0 and T2(τ) = (1 − φ)T(τ). Moving back in the
induction process, prior to searching agents anticipate their consumption
15An alternative would be to model the shock as a stochastically repeated event and
ﬁnd a corresponding state dependent pricing function. For a similar approach, see for
instance Bental and Eden (1993). As shown above, the simpliﬁcation allows us to use an
analytically derived pricing function thereby avoiding numerical methods to compute the
latter.
18stream conditioned on the search outcome and the occurrence of a crisis.






Given a policy, i.e. no intervention or intervention with a corresponding
ﬁnancing scheme, the economy’s pre crisis stationary path is given by a tu 









where Σj∗∗ denotes the aggregate type dependent secondary asset holding and
the multipliers ϑ
j are type dependent to be further deﬁned below. This tuple





Q(t),ds(t),dσ(t),w(t),p(t)}t≥τ deﬁne an equilibrium of the economy. These
two tuples are interdependent; the post crisis path depends on the economy’s
state at period τ, i.e. Q∗∗. The latter is part of the pre crisis stationary
path, which in turn depends on expectations concerning, in particular, the
secondary assets price at the crisis, p(τ).
This complex system can be reduced, in the ﬁnal analysis, to two vari 
ables: Q∗∗ and p(τ). Depending on the policy, either system (25) or (26) can
be used to determine p(τ) given an initial state Q∗∗.16 On the other hand,
given p(τ), the budget constraints (27) evaluated at market equilibrium, to 
gether with the ﬁrst order conditions which emerge from the pre crisis opti 
mization problems, result in a system that determines E1, including Q∗∗. To
see this, use the fact that ℓj∗∗ = 1 and the deﬁnitions of d∗∗
s ,d∗∗
σ ,w∗∗, and for
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where the multipliers ϑ
j are associated with σj∗∗ ≥ 0, so that ϑ
j ≥ 0 and
ϑ
jσj∗∗ = 0. The variable λ
∗∗ is given by the solution of (28). While at
the micro level λ
∗∗ captures the individual search eﬀort, at the aggregate it
measures the fraction of the young who found the high yield tree growing
technology. As discussed above, we assume that at the moment of the crisis
all high yield trees are destroyed (see Footnote 12). This captures a much
16Notice that in Section 3 the initial state was taken to be the economy’s steady state,
Q∗ whereas here it is Q∗∗.
19discussed feature of the crisis; while investments in complex ﬁnancial assets
were yielding high return, these were highly correlated.
Equation (29) refers to the FONC with respect to investments in new
trees (primary asset), whereas (30) to the FONC with respect old trees
(secondary asset). As we know from the post crisis path, the successful
searchers do not invest in the secondary market. Unless the risk involved in
the potential crisis is suﬃciently signiﬁcant, this feature will carry over also
into the pre crisis periods, resulting in ϑ
s > 0 and ϑ
us = 0. Finally, equations
(31) and (32) are the respective market clearing conditions for primary and
secondary assets. These equation are used to relate Q∗∗ to the individual
optimal investment decisions.
Since the crisis is a one time event, after the crisis has occurred the econ 
omy converges to its steady state. Figure 3 describes the evolution of the
relevant variables without intervention as percentage deviations from the
steady state. It illustrates that the pre crisis stationary path diﬀers from the
long run steady state. That diﬀerence is mainly due to the riskiness associ 
ated with the primary asset as next period its price in the secondary asset
market may decline, should a crisis take place. This feature generates two
eﬀects: it reduces saving and shifts the composition of the portfolio towards
the safe asset, namely old trees. Accordingly, while primary investment and
output are lower than in the steady state, secondary assets are priced higher.
20Figure 3: Anticipated Crisis with No Intervention
Figure 4 compares paths of the economy under various intervention schemes
to the corresponding no intervention values (in terms of percentage devia 
tions). We consider three taxation policies that ﬁnance the removal of toxic
assets from trade; a scheme which only taxes the young (dashed curves), a
scheme which taxes the old in a uniform fashion (solid curves) and a scheme
which taxes the old diﬀerentially, depending upon whether or not they have
been successful searchers (solid with inverted triangles).17 The third scheme
is intended to ”privatise the loss” by making those ”responsible” for the crisis
pay for its consequences.
17Figure 3 is drawn for the case in which the tax burden of the successful searchers
exceeds their share in the population by a factor of 2.5.
21Figure 4: Intervention vs. No Intervention: Anticipated Crisis
First consider the policy which taxes the old uniformly. Since the tax rev 
enue is used to ﬁnance the removal of toxic assets, at the crisis the secondary
asset price remains high. Hence, prior to the crisis the expected return on
investment in primary assets is larger than in the no intervention case. This
boosts the initial stationary path of primary investment, output and savings.
It also implies that at the crisis primary investment is higher than in the
no intervention case. In contrast, secondary asset prices are initially lower,
reﬂecting that prior to the crisis the demand for such assets is reduced and
the supply increased.
Next, let the tax be imposed on the young. Such a policy reduces their
disposable income, lowers saving and hence investment. Secondary asset
prices are still higher than in the no intervention case, but to a lesser extent.
Consequently, the impact on pre crisis primary investment is smaller. In fact,
taxing the young in order to ﬁnance the intervention, results in an output
path that is dominated by the one obtained by the alternative scheme.
The last policy imposes the cost of the intervention mainly on the suc 
cessful searchers (i.e., those who have invested in assets which became toxic
22at the crisis). Naturally, prior to the crisis this policy reduces the incentive
to engage in search (by more than one half relative to equal taxation). Since
fewer trees are generated by the high return technology, the average return
on primary investment is reduced. As a result, initial primary investment is
the lowest under this policy, and falls even short of the no intervention case.
This eﬀect is also reﬂected in the lower pre crisis output level, which in turn
is responsible for the lower saving at period τ. In contrast, the lower fraction
of trees generated by the high return technology at the initial path reduces
the impact of the crisis on output at period τ+1. This result obtains because
fewer orchards are destroyed by the crisis.
8 Concluding Remarks
Should we have, or should we have not, and who should have paid? Many
think we should have not. Former President Bush has recognized the objec 
tion: ”a lot of people” became distressed about ”spending taxpayer money
to give to Wall Street banks to save them” since ”they created the crisis in
the ﬁrst place”. Nevertheless, Bush believes we should have because ”TARP
saved the economy”.18
We ﬁnd that the answer to the above question is context dependent and,
in particular, hinges on the ﬁnancing scheme of the intervention program.
For instance, if we believe that the crisis came as a complete surprise, we
conclude that removing toxic assets was at best ineﬀective and could even
be harmful. Speciﬁcally, in our numerical example ﬁnancing the purchase
of toxic assets by taxing future generations signiﬁcantly exacerbates the cri 
sis. In contrast, if the crisis is stochastically anticipated, we ﬁnd that a
government commitment to remove toxic assets should a crisis occur can be
beneﬁcial from the point of view of output, in particular, if the program is
ﬁnanced by taxing the assets holder (the ”old”). In this sense we ﬁnd our 
selves at some odds with President Obama’s statement that ”those on Wall
Street” should not ”expect that next time, American taxpayers will be there
to break their fall.”
Finally, we address the popular sentiment to make those who ”created
the crisis in the ﬁrst place” pay for its consequences. To do so in the model,
we impose the bulk of the tax burden associated with the government inter 
vention on the successful searchers. Quite naturally, we ﬁnd that this policy
reduces toxicity in the economy and, thus, mitigates the crisis. However,
this comes at the cost of reducing output both prior and after the crisis.
18NBC News interview with Fromer President Bush,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/40028600.
23While the model is not designed to address other policies like limiting boni,
the conclusion suggests that responding to the current episode by policies
intended to limit the magnitude of a potential crisis may come at a cost of
lowering average output. One should notice that this conclusion, as well as
those related to other policies, have been drawn by examining the policy
impact on output solely. In particular, it ignores distributional issues and
”social justice” which may be at the core of the above sentiment.
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26APPENDIX I: Proof of Proposition 2
Given our Cobb Douglas speciﬁcation of the production function of new
trees, the wage and the marginal product of capital are given by:
ω(Q(t)) = (1 − α)AQ(t)
α A1
 (Q(t)) = αAQ(t)
α−1 A2




Q(t) + p(t)Q(t − 1) = Λ(1 − α)AQ(t − 1)α
ΨQ(t−1)α2−1







γ + (1 − λ)
 
.




Q(t) + νQ(t − 1)α = Λ(1 − α)AQ(t − 1)α
ΨQ(t−1)α2−1
νQ(t−1)α−1 = [αA + ν]Q(t)α−1
A4
Substituting Q(t) from the ﬁrst line into the second yields:
ΨQ(t − 1)α2−1
νQ(t − 1)α−1 = [αA + ν][Λ(1 − α)A − ν]
α−1 Q(t − 1)
α(α−1) A5
It is easy to verify that Q(t−1) cancels, so that the above expression implicitly
deﬁnes ν in (23) to satisfy:
Ψ = ν [αA + ν][Λ(1 − α)A − ν]
α−1 A6
Finally,   in (24) is given by:
  = Λ(1 − α)A − ν. A7
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